We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer. Similarly, buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted. These beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, accepted asks, and accepted bids. Then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus. The trading activity resulting from these beliefs and strategies is sufficient to achieve transaction prices at competitive equilibrium and complete market efficiency after several periods of trading.
INTRODUCTION
Ž . The double auction DA is one of the most common exchange institutions, used extensively in stock markets such as the New York Stock Exchange, commodity markets such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and in markets for financial instruments, including options and futures. The prevalence of this institution can be traced to its operational simplicity, efficiency, and its capacity to respond quickly to changing market conditions. Nevertheless, the DA is a persistent puzzle in economic theory.
How is information that is held separately by many market participantsᎏin the form of privately known reservation values and marginal costsᎏquickly and accurately coordinated through the trading process to reach the Ž . competitive equilibrium CE price and allocation? Ž In the double auction, any seller may at any time during a specified . trading period submit an offer that is then observed simultaneously by all buyers and sellers. Similarly, any buyer may submit a bid that is observed by the other buyers and by the sellers. When a buyer's bid is acceptable to some seller, that seller may then accept the buyer's bid, and a trade is executed between the buyer whose bid was accepted and the seller who accepted this bid. Similarly, buyers may accept a seller's offer at any time.
Market experiments have established that transaction prices converge quickly to a competitive equilibrium price in the DA for a wide variety of market environments. Experimental investigation of trader behavior and Ž . market performance in the DA began with Smith 1962 . Smith induced supply and demand conditions by giving buyers a redemption value for each unit of an abstract commodity purchased, and by giving sellers a cost for each unit of this abstract commodity sold. Buyers receive a surplus equal to the difference between their redemption value and the purchase price negotiated with a seller, and sellers receive a surplus equal to the difference between the purchase price paid by the buyer and their unit cost. Since reservation pricesᎏand therefore supply and demand conditionsᎏare known to the experimenter when this procedure is employed, the procedure makes possible a comparison between experimental outcomes and theoretical predictions. The basic result observed in these experiments is that prices do converge quickly to within a few cents of competitive equilibrium prices in markets with stationary supply and demand. Smith and many other economists in the 35 years since his initial studies have also documented features of the path of convergence to equilibrium in a variety of market environments. For surveys and interpre-Ž . Ž . tation of these experimental results, see Plott 1982 and Smith 1982 .
Models of trader behavior in the DA have been constructed by several Ž . Ž . authors, including Easley and Ledyard 1993 , Friedman 1991 , Gode and Ž . Ž . Sunder 1993 , and Wilson 1987 . Although these models have furthered understanding of the interaction of individual behavior and institution in the DA, we provide a model that accounts for several important regularities of double auction data that no one of the previous models predicts or replicates in simulations. For comparison of the predictions of the last three models with properties of experimental data, see Fried-Ž . man 1993, 1996 . We model individual behavior of sellers and buyers in a continuous DA and demonstrate that the persistent puzzle of convergence to CE prices and allocations in the DA can be resolved with traders whose information processing and strategy choices are simple and intuitive. For each possible bid, each buyer forms a subjective belief that some some seller will accept the bid. The buyer then determines which bid will maximize her own expected surplus. Similarly, each seller determines which offer will maximize his expected surplus. Subjective beliefs are formed using only observed market activity, including bids, offers, and accepts of bids and Ž offers. This procedure does not require any knowledge of the types costs . and valuations of other buyers and sellers; in fact, traders in this model do not even have beliefs about the types of others. Nevertheless, this behavior results in efficient allocations, and convergence of transaction prices to within a few cents of CE prices within several periods of trading. In addition, these beliefs respond quickly to changes in market conditions, such as shifts in market demand or supply.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The model is formulated in Section 2. Simulations of the model are shown and some important statistical properties of these simulations are reported in Section 3. Section 4, the conclusion, summarizes the relationship between our model and experimental data.
THE MODEL
Like most forms of market organization, the double auction is an informationally decentralized system. Our model emphasizes this structure to give a more compelling answer to Hayek's question: How is privately held information coordinated through the market process? Hurwicz et al. Ž . 1975 have shown that in general equilibrium environments, even with nonconvexities, there are simple and intuitive forms of market organiza-Ž . tion and bidding behavior which they call the B process that lead to Ž . Pareto optimal outcomes. Gjerstad and Shachat 1996 construct a map between partial equilibrium environments of standard market experiments and general equilibrium economies. In this paper, we develop a model of informationally decentralized bargaining for these environments that results not only in Pareto optimal outcomes, but also in substantial stability of transaction prices. Our bargaining model, together with the general equilibrium interpretation of the environments considered here, results in a model of learning competitive equilibrium in a class of general equilibrium environments.
In this section, we describe the elements of a microeconomic system, interpret the double auction environment and institution within this framework, and construct an informationally decentralized model of trader behavior for these environments in the double auction institution.
The double auction is an example of a microeconomic system, as in Ž . Ž . Hurwicz 1972 and Smith 1982 . The primary features of a microeconomic system are the en¨ironment e, consisting of the characteristics of the economic agents, and the institution I, which includes the messages that traders may send to one another, the allocation rules, and the adjustment ( ) process rules. A microeconomy is an economic system S s e, I , together with behavioral actions ␤ i for market participants, as shown in Fig. 1 . Ä 4 The environment e consists of a set A A s 1, 2, . . . , n of agents, and for each agent i characteristics e i consisting of that agent's preferences, technology, and endowment. The environment is then e s Ł e i . The
institution I consists of a message space M i for each agent, an adjustment process rule specifying the sequence of agent messages, and an outcome Ž . When an environment e and an institution I are specified in a market experiment, and an outcome X is observed, the only elements remaining to Ä i Ž i .4 be specified are the behavioral actions ␤ H ¬ e , I
where H is the
history of activity observed by agents through time t. The focus of the Ä i Ž i .4 research in this paper is to specify forms of behavior ␤ H ¬ e , I that
are consistent with observations X from exchange environments e when the institution I is the double auction. We now describe a representation of the double auction in terms of this framework. 
En¨ironment
In the double auction market environments we consider, there are two goods: an experimental currency X and a fictitious commodity Y. Our theory addresses the case of markets with the set of traders partitioned into a group I of sellers and a group J of buyers. Gjerstad and Shachat 1996 GS96 show that the cost vector of each seller i g I is dual to a technology that is described by a production 
4
Since buyer j with redemption value¨l makes a monetary gain at any j purchase price p -¨l, and since buyers' preferences are assumed to be j monotonically increasing in monetary gain, this buyer is willing to pay any price up to¨l for the lth unit purchased. Therefore, the demand shown in Ž . The diagram on the left of Fig. 3 If the production functions and endowments of the remaining three sellers and the utility functions and endowments of the other 3 buyer are FIGURE 3
ÄŽ
.4 4 constructed in this way, then the environment is e s f , j
. In what follows, we refer to this market as the symmetric j b,j js1 market design.
Trading Periods
A typical laboratory market experiment involves trading over several periods. Each seller has costs induced for the trading period, and each buyer has valuations induced. A buyer's valuation for a unit remains in effect throughout the trading period or until the buyer transacts that unit. After a unit is transacted, the seller's cost and the buyer's valuation for the unit just transacted are removed from the supply and demand schedules, trading continues, and this process proceeds until there are no more surplus enhancing trades remaining, or until time expires in the trading period. At the conclusion of a trading period, the costs and valuations are reinitializedᎏpossibly at different amountsᎏin the subsequent period. In market experiment 3pda01, the supply and demand conditions in Fig. 2 were employed in each of nine trading periods, each lasting 300 sec.
Institution
In the double auction, sellers post ask prices and buyers post bids. The message space defines the set of allowable messages for each agent. In this paper we consider the double auction with a bid᎐ask spread reduction rule Ž . defined below . In effect, this produces restrictions on agents' messages as a function of some previous messages of other agents. In a microeconomic system, adjustment process rules specify the set of allowable messages for each trader, the time when exchange of message begins, a transition rule governing the sequencing and exchange of messages, and a stopping rule. The DA imposes no restrictions on the sequencing of messages: any trader can send a message at any time during the trading period. Allocation of units is by mutual consent between any buyer and seller. If a seller's ask is acceptable to a buyer, then a transaction is completed when the buyer Ž . takes accepts the seller's ask. Similarly, a buyer's bid may be accepted by a seller.Ž Ž . D EFINITION 4 SPREAD REDUCTION RULE . The lowest ask in the market at any time is called the outstanding ask and is denoted oa. At anỹ time sellers may place an ask a g N with a -oa. The highest bid is called the outstanding bid ob. At any time, buyers may make a bid b g N above the outstanding bid. The outstanding ask oa and outstanding bid ob define w x the bid᎐ask spread ob, oa . In markets with a spread reduction rule, all bids and asks must fall within the bid᎐ask spread.
Note that in a double auction with the bid᎐ask spread reduction rule, any ask that is permissible must be lower than the current outstanding ask, so each new ask either results in a trade or it becomes the new outstanding ask. A similar remark applies to bids.
If seller i sends the message i, 0, a and holds the outstanding ask oa s a, then a take of oa by buyer j is an agreement by j to purchase a unit from seller i at the transaction price p s oa. Buyer j accepts the outstanding ask oa by sending the message Ž . 0, j, b , where b G oa. Similarly, if the outstanding bid ob is held by buyer j X , then a take of ob by seller i X is an agreement by i X to sell a unit to buyer j X at the transaction price p s ob.
Ž .

Obser¨ed History Outcome
Ž . E XAMPLE 2 MESSAGES AND HISTORIES . Consider the market of Example 1 depicted in Fig. 2 . If the first action in the period is an offer of 3.00 Ž . by seller 3, we indicate this with the message m s 3, 0, 3.00 . Suppose 1 that the next action is a bid of 3.00 by buyer 1, which we indicate with the Ž . message m s 0, 1, 3.00 . At this point a trade is completed between seller 2 3 and buyer 1 at the price 3.00. We indicate the history of these two messages by the list Ä 4
s 3, 0, 3.00 , 3, 1, 3.00 .
Note that in H the triple h unambiguously denotes an accept by buyer 1 2 2 of the offer of 3.00 made with message 1 by seller 3, because seller 3 holds Ž the outstanding offer of 3.00, which is the transaction price. See Accept of . oa in Definition 6.
Ž . D EFINITION 6 HISTORIES . After n messages have been sent, there will be a history H consisting of n ordered triples. For any message m s n nq1
that is sent, one of six cases will hold:
An invalid ask will not be included in the history. In effect, the institution ignores messages that violate the spread reduction rule. Similarly, a Ž . 
. The seller's identity is found by looking back in accepted for a transaction to take place, we take the point of view that sellers will maximize expected surplus myopically, where the expectation is Ž . taken relative to beliefs p a that an ask a will be accepted by some buyer. Ž These beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data as . described in Section 2.4.2 . Similarly, buyers are assumed to maximize expected surplus myopically, where the expectation is taken relative to Ž . beliefs q b that a bid b will be accepted by some seller.
The history that traders consider in forming beliefs is restricted to those Ä 4 messages leading up to the last L transactions, where L g 0, 1, 2, . . . . The parameter L is the memory length of traders. Note that the numbers of messages remembered and the clock time elapsed within the traders' memory may vary, while the number of trades completed within the Ž . traders' memory does not vary once L trades have occurred . The next definition provides a procedure for truncating the history, so that beliefs can be constructed using the data within the traders' memories. The Ž . procedure for constructing beliefs using this truncated history is described in Section 2.4.2. Note 1. We will work with the vector H , although traders do not have n access to all of the information in H . Traders know their own asks or n bids, but do not know the identity of the trader making other bids or asks. Information about identities is not used in the formation of beliefs or strategies, so use of H is made only to avoid complicating notation. n Ž . D EFINITION 7 REMEMBERED HISTORY . Let H H be the space of possin ble history vectors of length n. Given H g H H , we make the following n n definitions:
whether a trade occurred in the kth element of the history.
resulting from the first n messages.
Remembered history. Let L be the memory length of a given trader. Ž Ž ..
X
For fixed n and H , to simplify notation, let S s S T H . Let n be the 
is either the outstanding ask or the outstanding bid, as a consequence of Ž . the spread reduction rule, and if T H s 1, then there is no outstanding n n Ž . bid and no outstanding ask. If T H s 0 and h s 0, then h is the
is H with h and h removed. This is done because it is n n n n # not known at time n if the outstanding ask or bid will be accepted. Ž . While the frequencies p a and q b tend to be monotonic when thěň umber of asks and bids is large, there is more variability in small samples. For this reason, it is useful to work with a modification of these summary statistics.
Ž .
Modification of p a is made by taking the point of view that if an asǩ a X -a is rejected, then had that ask been made at a it would also have been rejected. This assumption is made because a ) a X and is therefore less appealing to buyers than a X , which was rejected. Similarly, if ask a X ) a was made and taken, then that ask would also have been taken if it were made at a. Furthermore, if a bid b X ) a is made, then an ask a X s b X would Ž have been taken if it had been made the assumption being that this ask of X X . a would be acceptable to the buyer who bid b . This heuristic ᎏand an analogous one for buyers' beliefsᎏare formalized in the next two definitions.
Ž . Then p a is the seller's belief that an ask amount a will be acceptablê to some buyer. We assume that sellers always believe that an ask at a s 0.00 will be accepted with certainty, and that there is some value Ž .
Ž . The notation of Eq. 3 is simplified by the following definitions. Let
These are the taken asks greater than or equal to a, the bids greater than or equal to a, and the rejected asks less than or equal to a, respectively. Ž . Then Eq. 3 may be rewritten as
We assume that buyers always believe that q 0.00 s 0 and that there iŝ Ž . some value M ) 0 such that q M s 1.
Ž . As in Definition 10, to simplify notation in Eq. 5 we introduce
These are the taken bids less than or equal to b, the asks less
than or equal to b, and the rejected bids greater than or equal to b. Then
With the specification of seller's beliefs in Definition 10, the belief Ž . Ž . function p a is a monotonically decreasing function of a Proposition 1 .
Ž . Ž . The argument of p и is the price that the seller asks, and the value of p и Ž . at a represents the seller's assessment of the probability belief that an offer at a will be accepted by some buyer. It is reasonable to expect that seller's beliefs are monotonic: this captures the intuition that a trader who has seen an ask of a rejected should decrease the belief that a will be accepted later, and decrease the belief that an ask at any value greater than a will be accepted. The buyers' belief function has an analogous Ž . property: q b is a monotonically increasing function of the bid b.
Spread Reduction Rule and Beliefs
The spread reduction rule has the effect of making the probability of a Ž take for an ask a G oa equal to 0 where oa is the outstanding offer from . 
Cubic Spline Interpolation
The belief functions in Definition 12 are defined on the set D of all offers and bids within the traders' memory. These beliefs are extended to the positive reals using cubic spline interpolation. For each successive pair Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. of data points a , p a and a , p a , we construct a cubic equa-k
3 2 tion p a s ␣ a q ␣ a q ␣ a q ␣ passing through these two points 3 2 1 0 with the following four properties:
These four conditions generate the four equations represented in matrix Ž . Eq. 7 below. The coefficients ␣ are obtained as the solution to the
Ž . Ž Ž .. The function q b is defined similarly, using the pairs b , q b and
Monotonicity of Beliefs
Ž . The function p a defined in Section 2.4.2 is monotonically nonincreas-Ž . ing. That is, as the ask a is increased, p a ᎏthe belief that an ask a will Ž . be acceptedᎏis nonincreasing in a. Similarly, q b is nondecreasing in b: buyers believe higher bids are more likely to be accepted. These results are proven in Propositions 1 and 2. This monotonicity property is extended Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . successively to p a , q b , p a , and q b in Propositions 3᎐6.˜Ž w Ž . the right side, then divide both sides of the resulting inequality by G a 1 Ž .xw Ž .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition Ž .
Timing of Messages
Let t be the parameter for time within a trading period. Let T be the w . length of the trading period and let t g 0, T be the time of the th offer, bid, or acceptance of an offer or bid. At time t let T be the s, i unit k. We assume that the seller will attempt to maximize the surplus of each unit in sequence, independently other units. In addition to simplifying the strategy choice, this is consistent with the myopic formulation of strategy choice. A similar remark applies to buyers. random variable that specifies the time that seller i would allow to elapse before sending a message; let T be the random variable that specifies
Then the probability that seller 1 is the next seller to move will be the probability that T -T , i.e.,
After substitution of the definitions of ␣ and ␣ , the expression in
Eq. 13 is the same as Eq. 12 for i s 1. B
There are two reasons for defining the timing of each trader's message as an exponential random variable. The first is an important conceptual issue: with this formulation, the mechanism is informationally decentralized, in that the information about each trader's surplus is not held by any Ž . agent. Each trader's timing decision is independents of any unobserved characteristics ᎏsuch as costs or valuationsᎏof other traders. The second issue is empirical. With this formulation, the timing of bids and asks is testable within the model, and it is possible to compare the timing data for Ž .
Ž . where a g 0, 1 . This specification has been chosen to reflect two empirical observations about timing of bids and offers in experimental markets. There is strong positive rank-order correlation between buyers' valuations and the order in which buyers purchase units, and strong negative rank-order correlation between sellers' costs and the order in which units are sold. In the formulation above, buyers with high valuations will have higher maximum expected surplus, and will therefore have a larger parameter ␤ for the b, j timing decision. Since the expected time until buyer j sends a message is proportional to the reciprocal of ␤ , buyers with high valuations will tend b, j to send messages more frequently and will trade earlier. Similarly, sellers with low costs will trade earlier. The second observation is that trading activity is typically concentrated at the beginning of the trading period, when many high surplus units are traded, and toward the end of the Ž . Ž . Ž . period. The term Tr T y at in Eqs. 14 and 15 is consistent with these observations, since high surplus units will trade earlier, but as t ª T, this Ž . term approaches 1r 1 y a , and low surplus units will be traded toward the close of each period if a is near 1.
Although the model is formulated so that timing data can be obtained Ž . and examined, we have followed the reduced form in Eq. 12 in simulations and generated messages without the time stamp.
Ž . E XAMPLE 3 BELIEFS, SURPLUS, AND TIMING . Consider again the market of Example 1. In Example 2 we discuss the first two messages sent in ÄŽ . experiment 3pda01, which result in the history H s 3, 0, 3.00 , After the trade between seller 3 and buyer 1 in this example, the lowest cost units of sellers 1᎐4 are 1.90, 1.40, 2.30, and 1.65, respectively. The highest unit values for buyers 1᎐4 are 2.25, 2.80, 2.60, and 3.05. The expected surplus maximizing bids and offers and the maximum expected surplus for each agent are easily determined from these values and costs Ž . Ž . and the belief functions in Eqs. 16 and 17 . The values of the maximum expected surplus for buyers 1᎐4 are 0.38, 0.66, 0.55, and 0.81. For sellers 1᎐4, the values of maximum expected surplus are 2.55, 2.91, 2.27, and 2.73.
Ž . As a result, given the formulation of the timing of messages in Eqs. 14 Ž . and 15 , in our model an offer will be more than 4 times as likely as a bid with this history. Even if the next message is an offer, the expected surplus of sellers will continue to be greater than the expected surplus for buyers, and there is a high probability of a series of decreasing offers. As a result, the next transaction price is likely to move toward the market equilibrium of 2.35.
SIMULATIONS
While the formation of traders' beliefs, their choices of strategies, and the timing of messages are simple and intuitive, the dynamics of the model are complex because of the nonstationarity of beliefs and the probability distribution over the timing of agents' messages. As a result, analytic characterization of properties of the model is difficult to obtain. For this reason, much of the evidence presented on the performance of the model is from simulations. It may be possible to obtain analytic results on asymptotic convergence of prices to an approximate equilibrium, but asymptotic convergence alone does not provide information about the path. For the important question of the path of convergence to equilibrium, simulations are useful tool for investigating properties of this model.
Criteria
The primary objective of this section is to demonstrate that prices and allocations in our model converge to the competitive equilibrium price and allocation. To identify the effect on convergence to competitive equilibrium of the belief formation and strategy choice defined in Section 2.4, we compare the outcomes of simulations of our model to the ''zero-intelli-Ž . Ž . gence trade'' ZI model of Gode et al. 1993 , which has no belief formation or learning.
3 By convergence of the sequence of prices, we mean Ž . N that for some n G 1, each element of the sequence p of transac-0 n nsn 0 tion prices is ''close to'' p , the competitive equilibrium price. This condie tion is met if the mean absolute deviation of transaction price from equilibrium price is small, so we measure convergence using this statistic. Of course, convergence to competitive equilibrium implies convergence to a Pareto optimum, so we also test this weaker condition. With efficiency measured as the ratio of surplus extracted by agents to total surplus possible, we find that in simulations of the model, market allocations are Ž nearly efficient over 99.9% of possible surplus is extracted after several . periods of trading , and prices are close to competitive equilibrium prices. Note that while we do not examine the market allocation directly, the outcome is a competitive equilibrium if and only if the transaction prices are the competitive equilibrium price and the allocation is Pareto optimal, Ž . and we do establish that these two conditions hold approximately in simulations of our model.
En¨ironments
Throughout this section, we consider a market design with four sellers, each with finite unit costs for three units, and four buyers, each with positive unit valuations for three units. The unit costs and valuations for Ž . the design we consider are given in Example 1 of Section 2.1 and are Ž . depicted in Fig. 2 and in the left column of Fig. 5 . We reported statistics from seven laboratory market experiments reported initially by Ketcham Ž . et al. 1984 and statistics from 100 simulations of our model with the same environment parameters. Finally, to demonstrate that our model is capable of responding to shifts in market conditions, we show the results of a simulation in which the market design described above is employed through five periods of trading, and then for the remaining five periods of the simulation each unit cost and unit valuation are increased to amounts 0.50 above those employed in periods 1᎐5.
E¨aluation
The only free parameter in the model is the memory length of traders. We report simulations with memory length L s 5. For short memory 3 In this model, sellers make offers which are random and uniformly distributed on the w x interval c, M , where c is the seller's cost, and M is some upper bound on their set of w x possible choices. Buyers make bids that are uniformly distributed on 0,¨where¨is the buyer's valuation.
FIGURE 5
Ž . lengths L F 3 the outcomes are unstable. For long memory lengths Ž .
LG8 the outcomes are similar to those with intermediate memory Ž . lengths 4 F L F 7 , but computation time increases significantly. It should also be noted that beliefs change more slowly in markets with shifts in supply and demand if memory length is long, so traders with intermediate and short memory lengths will adapt to changes in market conditions more quickly. 
Efficiency
The sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses provides a convenient measure of efficiency for these markets. We evaluate the surplus obtained by traders in the market divided by the maximum surplus available to determine the efficiency of trade. Table I summarizes efficiency statistics from the seven laboratory markets, from 100 simulations of our model, and from 100 simulations of the ZI model. This table show that our model attains higher efficiency than both the laboratory experiments and the ZI model simulations.
Con¨ergence
The diagrams in the left column of Fig. 5 show graphs of the supply and demand conditions for the symmetric market 3pda01. On the right side of that figure in the top row is a graph of the sequence of transaction price through the nine periods of trading in this laboratory market. In that figure, the equilibrium price is shown as a solid line across the diagram. Ž . Ž . The belief functions p a and q b shown in Fig. 6 are produced using data from the the end of the second period of the simulation of Fig. 5 , using Definitions 10 and 11 of Section 2.4.2. In this graph, a seller's belief that ask a will be accepted by a buyer is shown for each ask from 2.32 to FIGURE 6 2.38; buyers' beliefs are shown for bids from 2.30 to 2.36.
4 These belief Ž . functions are monotonic see Propositions 5 and 6 , so the value of the Ž . sellers' belief is p a s 1 for all a -2.33 and it is 0 for all a ) 2.38. With this belief function, and with myopic surplus maximization, the optimal ask is approximately 2.33 for any seller with unit cost below 2.30. The buyers' belief functions in this case have a similar property: the optimal bid for a buyer with valuation of 2.40 or greater is 2.35. At the beginning of each period, the sellers' costs are 1.90, 1.40, 2.10, and 1.65 and the buyers' valuations are 3.30, 2.80, 2.60, and 3.05, so the first action at the beginning of the third period will be either an ask of 2.33 or a bid at 2.35. We see in the center row of Fig. 5 that the first transaction price is 2.35 in period 3 of this simulation: the belief functions and strategy choice described frequently produce transactions at equilibrium, even from the beginning of the trading period.
The figures in the bottom row of Fig. 5 show a simulation of the ZI model in the symmetric market environment. While the ZI traders attain high efficiency in this market design, that model does not result in the formation of equilibrium prices. In the ZI model, there is no belief formation process. As a result, there is no convergence of transaction prices to equilibrium, as the diagram on the right side of the bottom row in Fig. 5 clearly shows. 5 In Table II , the mean absolute deviation of transac-4 Note that the range from the lowest cost to the highest valuation in this market is 1.40 to 3.30, with an equilibrium price of 2.35; beliefs are focused in a narrow range around the equilibrium price.
5 w x Gode and Sunder 1993, p. 129 argue: ''By the end of a period, the price series in budget constrained ZI trader markets converges to the equilibrium level almost as precisely as the price series from human trader markets does.'' In the ZI simulation of figure 5, final trades in 8 of 10 periods are within 0.10 of equilibrium. We apply a definition of convergence that is more demanding and conforms more closely to the intuitive notion of convergence of market prices. We argue that prices in a stable market environment converge if, after several periods, the mean deviation of all trades from equilibrium is small. By this criterion, the ZI model does not converge to equilibrium. tion price from equilibrium price is shown for 100 simulations of the ZI model in the symmetric market design. 6 This statistic is also shown for 100 simulations of our model 7 for the seven laboratory markets. These data Ž . and the ZI simulation graph at the bottom of Fig. 5 show that the ZI model does not result in convergence to competitive equilibrium. The behavior in our model does produce convergence to approximate equilibrium prices after several periods of trading. The contrast between the outcome of the simulations of the ZI model and that of our model identify the effect on market convergence of belief formation and myopic surplus maximization in our model. From the graphs and the statistics, it is clear that this effect is substantial. Moreover, data on mean absolute deviation in Table II show not only that our model converges to within a few cents of the equilibrium price, but that the rate of convergence is similar toᎏal-though initially slightly faster thanᎏthat found in laboratory experiments.
Shifting Conditions
The diagram on the left of Fig. 7 shows two sets of supply and demand conditions. The lower set, shown with thicker lines labeled S and D, is identical to the supply and demand conditions in Fig. 2 and Fig. 5 . If after several periods of trading, buyers have each valuation increased by 0.50 and sellers have the cost of each unit increased by 0.50, then the new supply and demand are those shown with thinner lines in Fig. 7 . The equilibrium quantity of trade and the total surplus are unaffected by this shift, but the equilibrium price increases from 2.35 to 2.85. Since expectations focus near the original equilibrium after several periods of trading Ž . see Fig. 6 , the dynamics of movement to the new equilibrium can be examined by considering this type of market. The sequence of transaction 6 Although the mean absolute deviation in the last two periods of the ZI model simulations is less than in the first two periods, this is not the result of convergence. The price sequence in each period constitutes a draw from the same distribution. Ž . The timing specification employed in the simulations is given in equations 14 and 15 . In one alternative tested, all agents with positive surplus were equally likely to send a message. This resulted in higher variance in transaction prices and in more instability in the outcomes. prices from a simulation of our model in this type of marketᎏwith the shift occurring after five periods of tradingᎏis shown on the right side of Fig. 7 . From periods 6 through 10 in this market, the equilibrium price is 2.85. In the simulation shown, convergence to the original equilibrium occurs by the end of period 2. Beginning in period 6, the equilibrium price shifts up 0.50. By the end of the period 7, transaction prices establishes near the new equilibrium price. This simulation shows that in the model developed here, traders respond to shifting market parameters, and prices quickly adjust to a new equilibrium.
Boundaries on Performance
Although we have developed a model that simultaneously converges to competitive equilibrium prices, produces efficient outcomes, and responds quickly to altered market conditions, we want to indicate a direction for improvement in the outcomes of the bargaining behavior developed in our model. We do so by describing a distinctive feature of price sequences from experimental markets. reversed. This observation allows us to evaluate behavior in the model and uncover a key difference between the behavior of laboratory subjects and behavior in the model, providing direction for further research on bargaining behavior in DA markets. In laboratory trading experiments, there is a clear difference between mean prices of trades initiated by sellers and those initiated by buyers. For example, in the seven symmetric markets we consider, Table III shows the market equilibrium price for each of these experiments in column 2 and the mean difference of transaction price from the equilibrium in column 3. Column 4 shows the mean difference between the transaction price and equilibrium price for all trades initially proposed by sellers. Column 5 shows the same statistics for all trades initially proposed by buyers. Note that in each of these seven experiments, the transactions initiated by sellers have a higher mean price than those initiated by buyers. Two additional data setsᎏone involving over 11, 000 tradesᎏare examined by Ž . Gjerstad 1995 and this price difference is a feature of all markets in both data sets considered there. In simulations of our model we find that this feature is reversed, and as a result, we are able to discern a different between the bargaining behavior of laboratory subjects and behavior in the model.
Ž . Ž . Consider again the belief functions p a and q b shown in Fig. 6 . In the description of the beliefs in these graphs in Section 3.3, we note that at the beginning of a period, sellers in this market with these beliefs will all have an optimal offer of 2.33 and buyers' optimal bids will all be 2.35. At the beginning of the third period, the first action will be either an ask of 2.33 or a bid at 2.35. Suppose that the first action is a bid of 2.35. As a result of the spread reduction rule, buyers' bids must be greater than 2.35.
Ž 2 . A bid of 2.36 would result in an expected surplus¨y 2.36 и 1 for each j of the four buyers in this market. Since the distribution of costs and valuations at the beginning of each period in this market is symmetric, and since the probability of each trader being the next to send a message is Ž . equal to that trader's proportion of total surplus see Proposition 7 , the probability that a buyer will send the next message is approximately 0.50, so that the probability of two consecutive bids is approximately 0.25, and in this case the price will be above the equilibrium price. In general, the distribution of absolute deviations from equilibrium is approximately geometric, since a low price results from a sequence of asks and a high price results from a sequence of bids. Recall that in Table III , the transactions initiated by the selling side typically are above equilibrium, so the simulations and the laboratory markets lead to the opposite result in this respect. While this is a subtle feature of DA data, a model that eliminates this difference would capture fine aspects of bargaining behavior and would represent progress in modeling behavior in this institution.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have defined beliefs for agents in a double auction market that are generated endogenously on the basis of observed market activity. An agent's choice of an action depends only on these beliefs and on that agent's private information about his or her own costs or valuations. Agents who adopt the simple bargaining strategy of myopic expected surplus maximization and employ these beliefs trade at prices that converge quickly and accurately to within several cents of the market equilibrium price and reach the competitive allocation. These beliefs and strategies are flexible enough to respond quickly to changes in supply and demand conditions.
Laboratory market experiments dating back 35 years have demonstrated that human subjects quickly and reliably reach competitive equilibrium outcomes. The model developed in this paper demonstrates that this capability of double auction market participants to reach competitive equilibrium outcomes may result from simple, intuitive information processing and strategy choice. Since we know that laboratory subjects operate with limited information-processing capabilities and boundedly rational strategy choices, this finding resolves, at least for the class of environments considered here, the puzzle Hayek posed.
